Beyond alliance and patronage: asymmetric interdependence and structural power in Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations

Introduction

The bilateral relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have long been exceptionally close due to similarity of religious identities, ideological orientation and strategic cooperation. Defense cooperation, oil supplies and financial assistance have been some of the key dimensions that make it a strategic partnership with some enduring convergences. Saudi Arabia is one of the most important political, economic and diplomatic allies of Pakistan since its birth in 1947, using intertwined instruments of religion, culture, and Islamic education to influence Pakistani state and society (Ahmed & Karim, 2024). When discussing the relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the context of international relations, it is generally described as a security alliance or a patron- client relationship (Rizvi, 1981; Kumar, 2025): Saudi Arabia offers material assistance in return of geopolitical and military loyalty from Pakistan.

Even though conventional analyses shed important light on various aspects of the relationship, they do not illuminate the aspect of power dynamics in the context of everyday economic, institutional and social connections that define Pakistan- Saudi relationships. Even interdependence per se can be an asymmetrical source of influence, as opposed to a mechanism that is neutral or mutual. This paper contends that the best theoretical approach to study Pakistan- Saudi relations is the Complex Interdependence Theory (CIT), especially in terms of asymmetric vulnerability interdependence. As developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s, the CIT rejects the central premise of realism that the most significant currency of international politics is military power. Rather it focuses on economic relations, institutionalized collaboration and transnational relations as important levers of power (Keohane & Nye, 2012). Notably, the CIT does not presuppose the equality of interdependent state because this theory differentiates between 'sensitivity interdependence' and 'vulnerability interdependence'. The former refers to mutual costs imposed within existing policy frameworks, implying that changes in policies of one state impose costs on another state. Quite often, these costs can be mitigated by one side through making short- term adjustments in policies without leading to long- lasting power advantages to the other side. On the other hand, vulnerability interdependence refers to a situation where a state has to incur substantial costs even after changing policies because of lack of alternative options or because costs of policy adjustments are too high. The asymmetries in vulnerability i.e., the differences in adjustment costs incurred by the states in cases of disruption, are the main source of power for the less vulnerable state (Keohane & Nye, 2012). On the other hand, the more vulnerable state faces higher long- term adjustment costs, and this makes it more susceptible to influence.

To complement the CIT is the notion of structural power, as put forward by Susan Strange. It says about the capacity to control and determine the very structures of global political economy (security, production, finance and knowledge) within which states have to function (Strange, 1988).

The structural power operates through arrangement of rules, norms and frameworks that will define the actions that are either feasible or costly to take. The interdependent relationships characterized by the asymmetries of vulnerability witnesses the most powerful actor wielding structural power in a non- coercive manner by limiting conditions that control the dependent actor's choices. For instance, the powerful actor can change the pattern of market access, financial frameworks or redesign regulatory standards in such a manner that would raise the costs of adjustment for the dependent actor. Seen in this way, the vulnerability interdependence and structural power are mutually supportive in that asymmetric dependence brings about the conditions for structural power, whereas structural power formalizes asymmetries through time.

When this framework is applied to Pakistan- Saudi relations, one can notice the tendency of uneven interdependence. The economic vulnerability, dependency on remittances, and lack of other viable diplomatic options are the sources of high levels of vulnerability in the case of Pakistan. In its turn, Saudi Arabia enjoys diversified economy, huge financial reserves and flexible foreign policy options. Such asymmetries enable Saudi Arabia to exercise structural power to influence the foreign policy decisions of Pakistan which reduces its freedom of choices.

Pakistan-Saudi relations: a case of asymmetric interdependence

The Pakistan- Saudi Arabia relations serve as a clear example of the concept of complex interdependence that can take place on the economic, security, institutional and social levels. But a closer examination reveals that there exist structural power asymmetries of vulnerability that define this high- profile bilateral interaction. Pakistan is immensely dependent on Saudi assistance for macroeconomic stability and strategic security, and Saudi Arabia continues to have a high degree of autonomy, diversified relationships and a significant leverage in many areas of partnership. This disproportional interdependence echoes the larger processes inherent to the formulation of Keohane and Nye. Dense networks of engagement need not generate equality, but may generate hierarchical processes in which one actor has structural power over the other.

Economic interdependence

The most prominent sphere of relations between Pakistan and Saudi is economic interdependence, which however is quite one- sided. Pakistan is of great significance to the labour market in Saudi Arabia as it produces a huge expatriate labour force and is a significant oil consumer and investment destination. However, the Pakistani remittances from Saudi Arabia comprise a large portion of its foreign reserves, and the Saudi oil constitutes almost a quarter of the imports in Pakistan. Pakistan's reliance on Saudi Arabia is evident in three main domains which include energy supplies, financial aid and remittances.

1. Energy dependence

In particular, structural vulnerability is highlighted by energy dependence. Pakistan is a major importer of its oil requirements with a main share of the oil imports being Saudi. In times of economic crisis, such as balance- of- payments shortages in 2018- 19 ($3 billion in cash and deferred payments for oil imports worth another $3 billion) and the more recently during 2023- 24 financial distress, Saudi Arabia supplied oil on deferred payment plans or concessional terms (Gul, 2018). Pakistan has been facing serious problems of external debt and the current account deficit and their resolution is a prerequisite for its economic revival and security. Immediately after the Ukraine crisis, one Pakistan- based think- tank even contented that there was a strong likelihood that the Pakistan economy would either default or experience a Sri Lanka- like situation if remedial steps were not taken, one of which included asking "a Saudi facility for deferred payment for oil" (Institute for Policy Reforms, 2022). In early 2025, the Pakistani government again requested Saudi Arabia to defer by one year a $1.2 billion payment on the country's oil imports, and Riyadh approved this import financing facility in February 2025 through the Saudi Fund for Development (Reuters, 2025). Clearly, the ability to regulate energy supply by controlling costs and permitting late payments or springing credit provides Saudi Arabia with a considerable bargaining power over Pakistan's financial stability. In terms of CIT, this is a good illustration of vulnerability interdependence, because Pakistan is exposed to high adjustment costs in the event of disruption, whereas Saudi Arabia has several alternative markets to which to sell its oil.

2. Financial assistance

The asymmetric vulnerability is also enhanced by the Saudi financial aid to Pakistan. The Saudi aid is usually in form of deposit in the State Bank of Pakistan, concessional loans or actual grants, especially when there is severe fiscal crisis. Saudi financial interventions in Pakistan are ad- hoc and political in nature unlike multilateral institutions that function under standardised structures and regulatory controls. Such support would get Pakistan through IMF talks and prevent economic meltdown. It should be noted that in 2019, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed an MoU worth US $21 billion in Pakistan, which comprised of a US $12 billion deep conversion refinery and petrochemical complex. However, these efforts failed to yield as geopolitical issues complicated them.

In 2019, the relations had worsened when Pakistan condemned the Saudi- led Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) due to its perceived inactivity or neutrality on the Kashmir issue and threatened to set up a rival institution. The core of this diplomatic turmoil was Pakistan's irredentism on the issue of Kashmir and the refusal to accept Saudi Arabia's even- handed approach on the Indo- Pakistani relationship. The invitation to India as the 'guest of honour' at the 2019 OIC meeting just two weeks after the Pulwama terror attack, when tensions between India and Pakistan were on the rise, was an indication of a major shift in Saudi foreign policy towards the two South Asian competitors (Cheyaden, 2022). Therefore Islamabad's indictment of the OIC was tantamount to criticism of Saudi Arabia and therefore was received extremely negatively in Riyadh. Relations took a downturn. In retaliation, Saudi Arabia recalled US $1 billion interest- free loan, and refused to renew deferred oil payment facilities, which greatly hurt Pakistan's economy (Bhowmick & Ghosh, 2023).

The relations also got colder when Saudi Arabia changed strategic priorities and turned to India signing US $100 billion worth of agreements (Laskar, 2023). However, since they have a long history of relations dating back to the period of Pakistan's creation and vast network of connections, efforts were made by Pakistani establishment to iron out differences, with PM Imran making a special state visit to Riyadh in May 2021 (Cheyaden, 2022). Relations were gradually back on track, and in 2023 Saudi Arabia promised Pakistan to pay it $3 billion in IMF bailout on the condition of fiscal discipline and to help Saudi priorities in the Gulf region, which is an illustration of how discretionary aid can strengthen leverage and affect foreign policy behaviour. This kind of arrangement proves that vulnerability can be used to create structures of power in which Pakistan, simply by being dependent, gives Saudi Arabia a chance to exercise influence without necessarily employing coercion.

3. Remittances

Remittances have become a lifeline for Pakistan's struggling economy. In 2024, Pakistan received US $34.6 billion in remittances which formed 9.4 percent of its GDP and contributed generously to the welfare of the household while supporting the balance of payments. Saudi Arabia stands as the largest source of remittances to Pakistan at US $7.4 billion, or 25 percent of total remittances received by Pakistan (UN Migration, 2025). Pakistanis work in Saudi Arabia in millions on the construction, services, and technical sectors and their remittances keep the households running and the foreign exchange reserves in Pakistan. In year 2023, more than 800,000 workers were registered with Pakistani authorities for migrant labour and almost 96 percent went to the Gulf countries. The biggest portion was absorbed by Saudi Arabia (49.5 percent), following by UAE (26.7 percent). In 2024, Saudi Arabia became the leading destination of Pakistani migrant workers with more than 62 percent of the registered overseas workers, resulting in the strategic role of Saudi Arabia towards economic stability and foreign exchange resilience of the Pakistani economy.

One of the major sources of migrant labour in the Gulf region is Pakistan. While majority of Pakistani migrants are either unskilled or semi- skilled, there is a trend that suggests highly- skilled workers would also prefer to move out of Pakistan for better employment opportunities in the Gulf, partly attributable to Pakistan's pro- emigration policies (Shah & Qazi, 2025). This explains the importance of remittances of Pakistani migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, which is an important pillar of economic interdependence. Research has shown that at the household level, remittances have ensured higher educational enrolment rates in Pakistan and better health outcomes for women and children compared to the households where no remittances are received. Furthermore, income earned by migrant workers abroad gives them the power to establish independent livelihoods (Shah & Qazi, 2025). Thus, any interference in labour access, such as the modification of visa policies, labour quotas, or restrictions on the labour market, can be an instant economic pressure, confirming Pakistan's structural vulnerability. In recent years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken stringent measures against Pakistani citizens living in these countries due to their involvement in organized begging and criminal activities. In 2025 alone, Saudi Arabia sent back 24,000 people from Pakistan on the grounds of begging. (NDTV, 2025; Mallik, 2025). It is likely that the Saudi labour reforms, targeting to provide more job opportunities to the local population as part of the Saudization program (Cyrill, 2025), would also create problems among Pakistani workers, which underscores the role of labour market control as an indirect form of leverage.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia has considerably less susceptibility in these fields of the economy. With diversified energy export markets and large financial reserves, Saudi Arabia has alternative sources of labour i.e. the Pakistani labour remains valuable but it is also mostly replaceable. This imbalance highlights the unequal allocation of the cost of adjustment, which by implication makes it possible for Saudi Arabia to influence the policy decisions of Pakistan in a subtle yet effective way.

Defense and security cooperation

Another level of asymmetric interdependence is security and defense relations. Traditionally, Pakistan has assisted the Saudi armed forces in terms of military training, advisory service and operational support and Pakistani officers have been appointed in advisory roles and defense arrangements between the two countries have been institutionalized (Shay, 2018; Zweiri & James, 2021). The efforts of Pakistan to strengthen the stability of Saudi regimes indicate the intentions of Islamabad to have a strong strategic partnership. However, security interdependence does not mean equality. Saudi Arabia has alternative security relationships which include strong partnership with the western powers such as the United States and France who provide it with the strategic flexibility to vary its security relationships.

On the other hand, Pakistan reaps huge political and financial gains by continuing to play the security role and receiving military assistance, and lobbying on the regional matters. For instance, the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, which was led by Saudi Arabia, revealed the complexity of strategic partnership, politics of pressure and dependence between Riyadh and Islamabad. The Pakistani government had, through the parliament, refused to join the coalition against Yemen due to the concern of Iran and fear of regional instability. But under massive diplomatic and economic pressure from Riyadh and other Gulf countries, this decision was slightly revised. As pointed out a scholar, this particular, episode highlighted the asymmetry of the bilateral relationship, where Saudi Arabian political and financial advantages influenced the foreign policy decision of Pakistan. This involved diplomatic persuasion and material concessions to push Pakistan into the rebalancing of its strategic position (Ahmed, 2018). This demonstrates the CIT principle that interdependence does not have to imply that there are no hierarchical power structures. In fact, the interconnection between Pakistan and Saudi increases interdependence and enhances Saudi power, as Islamabad depends on the relationship in terms of securing its own survival.

Institutional and social connections

Asymmetric interdependence is further institutionalized through deep-rooted cooperation and social connections. The bilateral committees, collective membership in Islamic institutions like Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as well as the organized religious diplomacy offer platforms for continuous communication and agenda- setting. The relationship is socially legitimized by religious solidarity and symbolic fraternity, which underlines interdependence in moral and ideological terms. Nevertheless, such cultural and institutional connections cannot overcome structural asymmetries. Quite the opposite, they tend to obscure the existing hierarchy to allow Saudi Arabia to wield power covertly without the need to appear rude while still creating an impression of a fraternal relationship.

Saudi Arabia is able to practice considerable religious diplomacy since it is the home of the two most sacred cities of the Islamic religion - Mecca and Medina. This allows Riyadh to exert disproportionate influence over Pakistan by projecting itself as the protector of the Islamic practices and norms, which lead to loyalty and legitimacy at the social level. To illustrate, the policies such as the Hajj facilitation programs sponsored by Saudi Arabia annually to Pakistani pilgrims, deepen interdependencies. For Hajj 2026, Pakistan has been allocated a quota of 179,210 pilgrims, for which 118,000 seats have been allocated to the government scheme (Imran, 2025). Although such interdependencies lead to increased social cohesion, at the same time they also increase Saudi bargaining power during policy negotiations.

Saudi Arabia's exercise of structural power

Saudi Arabia wields immense structural power towards Pakistan which is evident in multiple domains. This enables Saudi Arabia to determine the frameworks of interaction with Pakistan beyond relational or coercive power, thereby restricting the choices available with Islamabad. As regards four aspects mentioned by Strange, (security, production, finance and knowledge), the dominance of Saudi Arabia is specially manifested in the domain of finance and knowledge, which reinforces the asymmetries in vulnerability interdependence.

Saudi Arabia's huge wealth reserves and vast oil revenues make it a key external financier of Pakistan in the financial domain. It would be interesting to recall that when Washington had imposed economic sanctions on Islamabad following Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Saudi Arabia had provided the country with free oil for three years (Afzal, 2019). Since the 1980s, billions of dollars in aid, loans and deferred oil payments have been provided to Pakistan. This critical support has proved consequential in times of Pakistan's balance- of- payments crises which have become quite frequent due to economic mismanagement, soaring debt obligations and distorted national priorities. Besides, Saudi Arabia has parked billions of dollars in Pakistan's central bank that help it avert any default. However, this all- embracing support structure has also created vulnerability for Pakistan as any disruption in this would lead to unavoidable economic instability and restricted access to international markets, implying unbearable adjustment costs. On the other hand, there is only limited reciprocal cost for Saudi Arabia in case of any disruption. This asymmetry allows Riyadh to leverage financial aid for influencing Pakistan's policies, as witnessed in many cases discussed above.

Saudi Arabia's structural power is also felt in the sphere of knowledge, making its influence stronger in relationship between the two countries. Saudi Arabia has been involved in promoting religious- cultural norms and values in Pakistan through multidimensional frameworks. It has been funding Pakistan's religious seminaries, mosques and educational institutions which are aligned with its Wahhabi/Salafi ideology (Afzal, 2019; Press Trust of India, 2016), and has also invested huge money in various media outlets including news channels in Pakistan (Karim, 2025). Particularly since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when Saudi Arabia collaborated with the US and Pakistan to fund and train millions of Mujahedeen in their fight against the USSR, Saudi Arabia's religious influence has steadily proliferated across Pakistan, shaping societal and elite discourse in a decisive way because this embeds ideological affinity in influential policy- making circles in Pakistan (Ahmed & Karim, 2024). This has allowed Riyadh to sync the social- cultural norms of Pakistan with those of Saudi, thereby restricting Islamabad's freedom of action in transnational aspects of religion. The overall impact of these structural advantages has been that Saudi Arabia is capable of exercising non- coercive influence over Pakistan. This is disadvantageous for Pakistan because it limits its manoeuvring space and perpetuates an asymmetrical interdependence which is not a characteristic feature of traditional alliances.

Civil-Military mediation and interdependence securitization

Pakistan has been operating under a hybrid civil- military regime since Imran Khan came to power, with formal civilian government existing superficially and awkwardly alongside a military establishment that is deep- rooted and restrictive of its autonomous functioning. This system of governance, rightly termed "as a pseudodemocratic façade covering the reality of continued military tutelage" (Shah, 2019) has further strengthened the role of military in framing Pakistan's foreign and security policies. The most unique dimension of the contemporary Pakistan- Saudi Arabia relations is the mediation aspect of the hybrid civil- military government in Pakistan, which has influenced the management and functionality of vulnerability interdependence. The growing dominance of Pakistan military in foreign and security policies makes the country economically and institutionally dependent on the security- focused system which places more emphasis on regime stability and institutional interests of the military rather than a more diversified economy and an autonomous policymaking set- up which is governed on principles of regional peace and democratic accountability. Pakistan's lopsided civil- military nexus makes it imperative to rely on Saudi Arabia for strategic and operational requirements, making vulnerability interdependence a key factor of national security.

Economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, whether in terms of energy supply agreements, financial assistance or labour remittances, has been securitized. Military- to- military interaction enhances Saudi trust in the ability of Pakistan as a dependable security partner, and at the same time limits the ability of civilian institutions to renegotiate terms of relationship or enter into alternative partnerships with other countries. In 2019, then Prime Minister Imran Khan had indicated Pakistan would take part in a Kuala Lumpur conference, which was co- sponsored with Malaysia and Turkey, to build closer relationships between Muslim nations. However, following a last minute trip to Riyadh just before the summit, Imran suddenly cancelled his attendance at the summit and this sudden decision was seen to be giving in to Saudi interests because it threatened the relevance of Saudi- controlled OIC (Waikar & Osman, 2020). Two months later in February 2020, Imran had to visit Malaysia to placate the country's leadership for abruptly skipping the Kuala Lumpur (Press Trust of India, 2020).

Likewise, in December 2015 when Saudi Arabia tried to seek Pakistan's full military support in the Yemen conflict, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initially did not agree, and the Parliament voted to be out of the conflict. The decision of civilian government not to support Saudi Arabia in Yemen was based on two strategic calculations. First, its military was already overstretched in dealing with militants on its restive Afghan border, and therefore, a Saudi- led ground operation in Yemen would have been too challenging. Second, Pakistan was keen to maintain a healthy relationship with Iran, a vital source of energy for Pakistan (Ritzinger, 2015). Yet Pakistan eventually expressed its partial support to Riyadh, as reflected in the appointment of Pakistan's former army chief General Raheel Sharif as the first commander- in- chief of the Saudi- led counterterrorism coalition (Ahmad, 2017; Gul, 2017). This shows the persistence of the Saudi influence over the relationship. In this respect, the strategic arrangements, including the recently signed 'Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement' (SMDA) in September 2025, are one part of a multitude of ways in which the military priorities shape the bilateral relationship and institutionalize the elements of the defence cooperation without altering the inherent asymmetry of dependence.

Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed SMDA on 17 September 2025, making it a collective security framework under which an attack on one party would be an attack on both parties (Dahan & Shah, 2025). The agreement brings together over decades of bilateral military cooperation, such as troop exchanges, joint training exercises, sharing of intelligence and synchronized defence planning (Akhtar, 2025). However, in the eyes of Riyadh, the SMDA is more of a signalling system directed towards gaining strategic independence over Washington.

Even though Saudi Arabia has been operating under a relatively nonhostile stance towards Israel, its recent efforts to establish diversified security alliances are sending a message to the United States that Riyadh does have viable security options in the event American commitment to the Gulf region falters (Ardemagni, 2025). In effect, the deal is of little immediate operational benefit since Saudi Arabia remains still very close to the US and does not want a direct conflict with Israel. In this interpretation, the benefits to Riyadh are quite symbolic, which strengthens its diplomatic advantage without a significant change in the balance of military power. However, for Islamabad, the SMDA has substantial strategic value and domestic ramifications. In financial terms, Pakistan expects to receive more aid that will support its military budget, as well as supply it with the resources to modernize its army (White, 2025). Strategically, the pact is aimed at tightening Pakistan's hold in the Middle East, making it more influential security partner capable of projecting its power outside South Asia (Gambrell & Ahmed, 2025).

In terms of the Complex Interdependence Theory, this dynamic shows a deviation of classical expectations according to which interdependence decreases the salience of military power. As opposed to CIT, which expects dense connections between actors to influence policy and distribute power across multiple channels, the hybrid civil- military regime in Pakistan has shown the tendency to push the decision- making process through the military, which strengthens the relationship between Pakistani military and other regional and international actors. This institutional mediation enhances the structural power of Saudi Arabia. Saudi control of economic resources and cultivation of strategic partnership is internalized in Pakistan's military establishment and converted into policy decisions by Islamabad without coercion. In simple words, Saudi Arabia has the structural power to dictate without any explicit force.

Even the civilian ministries in Pakistan, which formally control economic policies, are in practice in an advisory or implementation role, with the overall strategic posture being orchestrated by the Pakistan military led by General Asim Munir (Kaura, 2025). This domestic institutional form of securitizing interdependence shows that asymmetry is not simply an effect of material vulnerability but equally a product of external impact mediated and exaggerated by internal governance institutions. Overall, the civil- military mediation of asymmetry in Pakistan- Saudi interdependence exemplifies how domestic institutional setup determines the externalization of structural power. The frame of economic dependence and strategic collaboration has strengthened hierarchical relationship while minimizing the role of independent policymaking in Pakistan. The SMDA would give an institutional foothold that tightens the military's strategic alignment within the wider asymmetric relationship.

Conclusion

This article indicates that Pakistan is vulnerable in terms of energy security and its financial dependence and labour market accessibility to Saudi Arabia is a multi- dimensional vulnerability. The security and institutional connections add to these economic dependencies and further limit the scope of Pakistan's strategic autonomy. Saudi Arabia, in its turn, is blessed with diversified economic resources, more security allies and greater financial standing, which significantly reduce its susceptibility to reciprocal vulnerability. It is this asymmetry of vulnerability that creates the imbalance of power asymmetry in the bilateral relationship. These asymmetries are what enable Riyadh to influence the policy decisions of Islamabad by setting the agenda, providing conditioned aid and strategic signalling instead of overt coercion.

Another important issue brought out by the article is that domestic institutions play a critical role in mediation of interdependence. The hybrid type of civil- military system in Pakistan has institutionalized Pakistan's dependency on Saudi Arabia and securitized the economic dependence as a strategic necessity. The process enhances the structural power of Saudi Arabia as it instills a sense of external reliance in domestic policy- making machinery of Pakistan, especially the military establishment. On the theoretical level, the article also shows that the concept of Complex Interdependence Theory is most analytically effective when supplemented by the notion of structural power and domestic institutional analysis. Even though interdependence does not necessarily flatten hierarchies, in some political and institutional circumstances it can reproduce the hierarchies. In terms of policymaking, it indicates that Pakistan's ability to attain long- term strategic autonomy cannot be based on enhancing security- based interdependence, but on alleviating vulnerability by means of economic diversification and institutional balance in governance. If these structural conditions are not addressed, relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will continue to show asymmetric interdependence where Saudi power will be practiced quietly, continuously and mostly out of sight.